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COMMENT
BARGAINING IN THE DARK: WHY THE
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE SHOULD
RENDER “NO DAMAGE FOR DELAY”
CLAUSES VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC
POLICY IN ALL CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS

MELINDA SARJAPUR *
INTRODUCTION
In the high-risk world of construction, a contractor’s ability to
recover damages associated with project delays caused by other parties
can mean the difference between realizing expected profits and suffering
harsh financial losses. 1 This Comment addresses the enforceability of
*
J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco,
California; M.L.I.S. University of Rhode Island, 2004, Kingston, Rhode Island; B.A. Journalism,
2001, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona. I would like thank my husband, Charan, for his
boundless love, friendship, and patience. I would also like to thank Professor Jon Sylvester and
Adjunct Professor Christine Tour-Sarkissian for their guidance. Finally, I am especially grateful to
the members of the Golden Gate University Law Review Editorial Board, without whose insightful
feedback, dedication, and expertise this Comment would not have been published.
1
J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia E. Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A Public
Policy Issue, 75 FLA. B. J. 8, 8 (Oct. 2001) (“A contractor who experiences delays during
performance is likely to incur increased costs.”); see also ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL.,
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR 49 (3d ed. 2011), available at
Westlaw CDRTC § 2.03 (noting the “enormous economic impact of construction delays due to the
highly time-sensitive nature of construction costs”); id. § 2.01 (“The typical contractor’s profit
margin—the percentage difference between revenues and costs—is very small in comparison to its
risk exposure. . . . [O]n almost every construction project, it is possible to lose much more money
than it is possible to make. It is not unusual for a job that constitutes only five percent of a large
contractor’s business to have the potential to destroy 50 percent or more of the company’s net
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“no damage for delay” clauses, (hereinafter sometimes called NDFD
clauses), 2 which bar contractors from recovering any delay damages,
even when delay has been caused by an owner or its agents. 3
The potentially devastating real-world consequences to contractors
of a broadly worded “no damage for delay” clause are well-illustrated in
the case of Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States. 4
In the summer of 1996, the United States Air Force awarded a
$17,724,714.00 federal contract to Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham (Harper)
for the demolition, removal, and replacement of 143 base housing units
in California. 5 In order to complete the work, Harper then signed a
$720,500.00 subcontract with contractor KCI to perform certain
landscape and irrigation services between July 1997 and January 1998. 6
Significantly, the form contract between Harper and subcontractor KCI
contained an NDFD clause stating that in the event of any delays, even
those caused by the fault of Harper or the United States government,
KCI would be barred from recovering any monetary damages. 7 KCI’s
general manager, who signed the subcontract, later testified that KCI had
believed the NDFD clause to be “a boilerplate phrase that’s contained in
most contracts that’s generally ignored because it’s not enforceable.” 8
Unfortunately, KCI’s reliance on industry belief, 9 as well as previous
common-law and statutory treatment, 10 proved highly damaging.
worth.”); 5 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 15:1 (2011), available at Westlaw BOCL § 15:1 (stating that during
construction projects, the “unexcused, untimely completion of scheduled activities can result in
enormous liabilities to all parties far exceeding anticipated profits and, at times, individual net
worth”).
2
These clauses are also known as “No Damage” or “No Damages for Delay” clauses.
Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause with Respect to
Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187, § 1[a] (1976).
3
See id. § 1[c].
4
Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667, 670 (2008)
(applying California law in a federal case).
5
Id. at 669.
6
Id. at 670.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Robert T. Sturgeon, Federal Court Holds “No Damage for Delay Clauses” Are Per Se
Enforceable on Federal Public Works Projects in California, CONSTRUCTION & INFRASTRUCTURE
LAW BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), www.constructionandinfrastructurelawblog.com/2010/03/
articles/public-works/federal-court-holds-no-damage-for-delay-clauses-are-per-se-enforceable-onfederal-public-works-projects-in-california (“Many California practitioners believe that the [rule
against ‘no damage for delay’ clauses] does or should extend generally to all construction contracts,
both public and private.”); see Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay”
Clauses, 6 CONSTRUCTION LAW 9, 10 (1985) (“California construction lawyers have long felt that a
‘no damage for delay’ clause would not be enforced where unreasonable delays have been caused by
the project owner.”); Construction Law Committee Compendium of Frequently Asked Construction
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Due to the work delays of another contractor hired by the United
States, Harper’s progress in completing its own work was delayed by
three months, which caused “a domino effect that pushed KCI’s work
into the rainy season.” 11 KCI was consequently unable to complete its
work until August of 1998, 223 days later than originally scheduled, and
alleged that it was further delayed as a result of the federal government’s
failure to issue final acceptance of the landscaping. 12 KCI estimated that
the delays of Harper and the Air Force had directly caused it to incur
$770,565.00 in increased performance costs, an amount greater than the
original contract price. 13 To recover its costs, KCI sued Harper, and as
part of a “Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release” between the
parties, Harper agreed to pass through KCI’s claim as against the Air
Force. 14 However, when the United States Court of Federal Claims
determined that the NDFD clause between private contractors was
enforceable under California law, KCI was forced to absorb the total
costs of damages caused by other parties’ delays. 15
Law and Professional Liability Related Questions, THE HARMONIE GROUP, 14-15 (May 2008),
www.harmonie.org/user_documents/COMPENDIUM%20FINAL%20WITH%20COVER.pdf
(providing results of a survey of state law firms, in which the responses provided by three California
firms with construction law practices indicated that “no damage for delay” clauses were not
enforceable in the state); Daniel R. Frost, No-Damages-for-Delay Clauses—They Still Work,
HOLLAND & HART LLP CONSTRUCTION LAW UPDATE 1, 3 (Jan. 2000),
www.hollandhart.com/articles/99200.pdf?CFID=8840471&CFTOKEN=95709572 (“Conventional
wisdom is that enforcement of no-damages-for-delay clauses is becoming harder and harder, if not
completely impossible. As a result, those clauses receive less and less attention in the negotiating
and administration process. In fact, at times, they are simply ignored, whether in or out of the
contract.”).
10
STEPHEN J. FOWLER, MILLER AND STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 3D §27:85 (2010),
available at Westlaw MILCALRE § 27:85 (explaining that “‘No Damage for Delay’ provisions in
construction contracts of public agencies and subcontracts thereunder are generally unenforceable in
California,” and that while such clauses are typically enforced in private contracts, they are strictly
construed and are “rarely enforced to preclude the recovery of costs incurred by reason of ownercaused delays”).
11
Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. at 670.
12
Id. at 670-71.
13
Id. at 671.
14
KCI had no direct privity of contract with the federal government and thus was unable to
sue the Air Force directly to recover its delay damages. In exchange for KCI’s agreement to dismiss
its lawsuit against Harper with prejudice, Harper agreed to “pass through” KCI’s claim to the federal
government under the Severin Doctrine. However, before a claim can be passed through to the
federal government by a prime contractor under the Severin Doctrine, the prime contractor has the
burden of proving that it is liable to the subcontractor for the damages sustained. The federal
government moved for summary judgment, alleging that Harper could not demonstrate liability to
KCI because of the NDFD clause in the contract between the parties. The court held that NDFD
clauses were enforceable as between private contractors in California, and fell outside the scope of
California Public Contract Code section 7102, which limits the enforceability of NDFD clauses in
public construction contracts. Id. at 676.
15
Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. at 679.
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As this case suggests, delays are a frequent subject of construction
litigation 16 because of their potential to inflate expenses for owners and
contractors, beyond those anticipated at the time of contracting. 17 It is
therefore not surprising that owners would seek contractual methods of
As
shifting the risks associated with delay to other parties. 18
demonstrated in Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, one tool employed for this
purpose is an NDFD clause. 19 These exculpatory clauses vary widely in
form, but they generally seek to deny a contractor 20 the right to recover
delay damages, including those caused by the delay of an owner or its
agents. 21 “No damage for delay” clauses have been a subject of
longstanding controversy in the construction industry 22 because of their
potential to cause significant monetary losses to contractors in the event
of owner-caused delays. 23
In 1984, the California legislature enacted California Public
Contract Code section 7102, which renders NDFD clauses void in public
works contracts when owners are responsible for delays that are deemed
“unreasonable” and “not within the contemplation of the parties.” 24
16

See BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS §
16.03 (4th ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CNDCL § 16.03 (noting that delay claims have become a
common occurrence in the construction industry).
17
A.B.A. FORUM ON THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
BOOK, 117 (Daniel S. Brennan et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008) (stating that in the event of delay,
contractors’ delay damages may include “increased labor and materials costs, extended job-site and
home-office overhead, lost alternative job opportunities, and increased general conditions costs
(including equipment rental, utilities charges, and site security). The contractor may also face claims
from subcontractors affected by the delay.”); see Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY
CLAIMS at § 1.01.
18
Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857
(2005).
19
Id.
20
Throughout this Comment the author will refer to the party seeking to enforce an NDFD
clause as “owner” and the party against whom an NDFD clause operates as “contractor.” However,
NDFD clauses may also bind subcontractors through application of “flow down” provisions
incorporated in prime construction contracts, or through their inclusion in contracts formed between
contractors and subcontractors. PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER &
O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 3:32 (2010), available at Westlaw BOCL § 3:32 [hereinafter
CONSTRUCTION LAW]; see Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. 667.
21
Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause With
Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 § 1[c] (1976).
22
See Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53
WASH. L. REV. 471, 471 (1978); see also Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at §
2.16.
23
See Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L.
REV. at 472.
24
CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (Westlaw 2011) (“Contract provisions in construction
contracts of public agencies and subcontracts thereunder which limit the contractee’s liability to an
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However, section 7102 is inadequate to protect contractors from the
harsh consequences associated with the ineffective and unfair NDFD
clause, because it places limitations on the protection afforded to
contractors in public works contracts and has no effect on private
These inadequacies have become more
construction contracts. 25
apparent in the wake of Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, in which the court
determined that under section 7102’s existing language, an express and
unambiguous NDFD clause creates an “iron-bound bar against any
potential liability” on the part of the owners in all private construction
contracts, including sub-contracts under contracts involving the United
States. 26
The purpose of this Comment is to urge the California legislature to
revise section 7102 in order to render an NDFD clause void as against
public policy in every construction contract when delay is caused in
whole or in part by the acts or omissions of the owner or its agents. Part
I of this Comment provides the reader with a brief explanation of how
construction contracts are formed and describes the nature of liability
associated with delay in the construction industry. Part II includes a
brief overview of the general enforceability of NDFD clauses and
chronicles the numerous exceptions to their enforcement that have
evolved through common law and state statutes. Part III presents policy
arguments against the enforcement of NDFD clauses and rebuts some
common arguments posed in favor of their enforcement. Part IV
discusses the current treatment of NDFD clauses in California and
challenges the effectiveness of existing legislation in the wake of
Harper/Neilson-Dillingham. Part V presents suggested language for the
revision of section 7102, modeled on the current Ohio Revised Code
Annotated, and explains the practical effect of the proposed revisions.
Finally, this Comment concludes by urging the California legislature to
revise California Public Contract Code section 7102 to render NDFD

extension of time for delay for which the contractee is responsible and which delay is unreasonable
under the circumstances involved, and not within the contemplation of the parties, shall not be
construed to preclude the recovery of damages by the contractor or subcontractor. No public agency
may require the waiver, alteration, or limitation of the applicability of this section. Any such waiver,
alteration, or limitation is void. This section shall not be construed to void any provision in a
construction contract which requires notice of delays, provides for arbitration or other procedure for
settlement, or provides for liquidated damages.”).
25
STEPHEN J. FOWLER, MILLER & STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 3D § 27:85 (2010),
available at Westlaw MILCALRE § 27:85.
26
Harper/Neilson-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667, 678-79
(2008) (“The court agrees with the government that, . . . California law does not provide exceptions
to the enforceability of clear and explicit ‘no damage for delay’ clauses in contracts between private
parties, including, as here, in subcontracts under contracts involving the United States.”).
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clauses unenforceable in all public and private contracts where the
owners cause delay.
I.

A CONSTRUCTION PRIMER: THE BIDDING PROCESS AND LIABILITY
ASSOCIATED WITH DELAY

Before discussing the significance of NDFD clauses in detail, it will
be helpful to begin with a brief overview of the general process through
which construction contracts are obtained and the nature of damages
stemming from delays.
A.

FORMATION OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS

Many private 27 and most public construction contracts are awarded
through a process called competitive bidding.28 The procedure for
competitive bidding on public projects is determined by state statutes and
regulations. 29 Typically, invitations to bid on a project are published in
local construction-industry trade papers and include materials such as a
project description, complete plans, instructions to bidders, bid forms,
and other contract documents. 30 These documents must provide full,
complete and accurate plans and estimates of cost to the extent necessary
to allow a competent mechanic or builder to carry them out. 31 On the
basis of the information contained in the bid documents, contractors are
asked to submit bids for the total cost of their work. 32 The bidding
process remains open for a specified period of time, after which all of the
27

See JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA
DOCUMENTS 252 (5th ed. 2010), available at Westlaw SCICA s 9.07 (“Generally, public contracts
must be awarded on the basis of competitive bidding. Even most private contracts, with the option
of bidding or negotiating, are awarded after competitive bidding. Only experienced owners, who
must deal with a small number of contractors, perhaps only one, with the technical skill needed, are
likely to use negotiation.”); see also PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER
AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 2:22 (2011), available at Westlaw BOCL § 2:22
(explaining that the process of sealed competitive bidding is mandated almost universally by statute
in public construction contracts, but is not widely used in private construction contracts; yet, “[e]ven
where the prime contract is negotiated . . . trade subcontracts frequently are awarded through sealed
bidding. Therefore, some form of competitive sealed bidding also continues to be well accepted in
both international public works and private contracting.”); KENNETH C. GIBBS & GORDON HUNT,
CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW 71 (16th ed. 2000).
28
JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 7:2 (6th ed. 2004), available
at Westlaw CACLM § 7:2.
29
JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND
DISPUTES § 2.3 (2d ed. 1990).
30
Id.
31
53 CAL. JUR. 3D, Public Works and Contracts § 36 (2012), available at Westlaw CALJUR
PUBLICWORK § 36.
32
Bruner & O’Connor, CONSTRUCTION LAW at § 2:23.
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bids submitted are reviewed and the contract awarded to the contractor
providing the most favorable bid. 33
In public contracts, competitive bidding is thought to promote the
public interest by stimulating competition, thereby ensuring a fair price
and protecting against government favoritism or corruption.34
Accordingly, public-contract statutes commonly require that a contract
be awarded to the “lowest responsible bidder.” 35 Technically, the
responsibility criterion means that in addition to price, a public entity
may consider the contractors’ trustworthiness, quality, fitness, capacity
and experience necessary to successfully complete the project when
determining which bid to accept. 36 In practice, however, rejecting the
lowest bid as “irresponsible” for any but the most compelling reasons is
considered highly unethical. 37 As a result of this practice, contractors
commonly expect construction projects to be awarded to the contractor
offering the lowest bid. 38
Although the competitive bidding process benefits owners by
placing contractors into free and open competition with one another, it is
inherently risky for the contractors. 39 After all, in order to remain in
business, a contractor must be the lowest bidder on a certain number of
projects. 40 To be the lowest bidder, a contractor must bid aggressively
on the basis of information concerning future conditions and factors that

33

Id.
See JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 7:2 (6th ed. 2004),
available at Westlaw CACLM § 7:2.
35
Id. (emphasis added); see CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10180 (Westlaw 2011) (requiring that
in California, state construction contracts be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder where
competitive bidding is required).
36
STEPHEN J. FOWLER, MILLER AND STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 3D § 27:33 (2010),
available at Westlaw MILCALRE § 27:33; see PUB. CONT. § 1103.
37
See Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 434 (2002)
(“To find out who is the low bidder, sealed bids are often compared to one another on the basis of
only one factor: price.”); JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES 60 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining that if the bidding process is already
restricted to a “prequalified” set of contractors, a public agency that selects a contractor other than
the lowest bidder may face allegations of favoritism or corruption); JOHNATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET
ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA DOCUMENTS 250-51 (2010), available at
Westlaw SCICA s 9.07 (stating that in competitive bidding “[t]he lowest responsible bidder (a
bidder capable of doing the job) is desired, but an award to anyone but the low bidder can invite a
lawsuit”); see also Bruner & O’Connor, CONSTRUCTION LAW at § 2:23 (stating that “selection for
the award may be made on the basis of price alone”).
38
See Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 434.
39
See id. at 430.
40
See id. at 434.
34
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may be largely unknowable at the time of bidding.41 A successful bidder
may need to speculate whether there will be a future increase in materials
costs, anticipate how future events will affect construction and estimate
the impacts of any details not included in the drawings. 42 At the same
time, contractors are afforded little to no bargaining power over the
underlying terms of the contract. 43 The owner is responsible for creating
the project specifications and is typically able to determine both the form
of contract and the extent of risk-sharing between the parties. 44 In this
highly competitive system, any attempt by a contractor to alter the
material terms of the underlying contract may result in an owner’s
decision to reject the contractor’s bid and select a more compliant
contractor from the range of available competitors. 45
Thus the
contractors’ relative lack of bargaining power, coupled with industry
knowledge that contracts will be awarded to the lowest bidder, gives rise
to “kamikaze-style” bidding practices and creates a system that rewards
contractors who undervalue construction costs and associated risks. 46
B.

LIABILITY ASSOCIATED WITH DELAY DAMAGES

Delay is recognized as “a way of life” in the construction industry
and is known to be one of the most prevalent and costly risks faced
during construction projects. 47 This is to be expected because the

41

See id. at 430.
See id.
43
See id. at 434; see also Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction
Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. 471, 482 (1978) (“When a project is advertised, a
contractor may not generally negotiate with regard to the specific terms of the contract. He must
either submit a bid on the contract as offered to the public or simply refrain from bidding. In this
situation, it is the owner who generally has the superior bargaining position.”); PHILIP L. BRUNER &
PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW §2:9.50 (2011),
available at Westlaw BOCL § 2:9.50 (“Because of wide industry use of the competitive sealed bid
process of contract formation in the public sector and its mandated contract terms, from which no
material exception may be taken without risk of rejection of bid as “‘nonresponsive,’” there is
perhaps less bargaining between owner and contractor over initial contract terms in the construction
industry than in other areas of commerce.”).
44
See Bruner & O’Connor, CONSTRUCTION LAW at § 2:9.
45
See id. § 2:9.50.
46
See Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 434.
47
ROBERT A. REUBEN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS: PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION 52
(2d ed. 1992); see ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE
CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CDRTC § 16.02 (“By far the most
commonly and hotly litigated claims of contractors involve delays caused by the owner or by
persons for whom the owner is responsible.”).
42
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modern construction process is inherently complex. 48 Building projects
often require the coordination of separate yet interdependent
performances by numerous parties, and timely completion can be
affected by factors beyond any one party’s control. 49 The ability of
contractors to recover monetary damages stemming from the delay of
others is critical, because the scope of such damages would be difficult,
if not impossible, to anticipate and bargain for at the time of
contracting. 50
There are many situations in which contractors may incur damages
stemming from owner-caused delays. 51 For example, a contractor may
be delayed due to an owner’s tardy submission of changes to the original
project specifications, untimely discovery of errors in the plans, failure to
obtain permits or issue immediate approvals for permitted work, or
intentional frustration of the contractor’s performance. 52 A contractor
could also experience delay as a result of the owner’s failure to
coordinate the work of any number of other independent contractors
under its control. 53 When construction projects involve the coordination
of separate performances by numerous parties, any one delayed
performance can cause a domino effect of further delays due to the
inability of other parties to begin performances on the agreed date. 54

48

See John W. Hinchey, Visions for the Next Millennium, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW
HANDBOOK 29, 31-33 (Robert F. Cushman ed., 1999) (explaining that a construction project of
average complexity may involve between five and fifteen firms working on the design process, as
well as forty to a hundred companies that are engaged in construction and many more companies
hired to supply materials and services necessary to complete the project); see Bruner & O’Connor,
CONSTRUCTION LAW at § 1.2.
49
S. GREGORY JOY ET AL., ALTERNATIVE CLAUSES TO STANDARD CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS 7 (2010), available at Westlaw ACSCC § 1.02 (explaining that ordinary construction
projects require the participation and risk the financial resources of a large number of parties). “If
one falls down, many others may follow. The chain of risk extends far beyond those who have
direct contracts with a failing party.” Id. See RICHARD A. LORD, Conditions Relating to Time of
Performance, in 15 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 46:7 (4th ed. 2010), available at Westlaw
WILLSTN-CN § 46:7.
50
See Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857,
1877 (2005).
51
See BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS §
3.02 (4th ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CNDCL § 3.02; ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL.,
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2011), available at
Westlaw CDRTC § 16.02.
52
Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 3.02; see Douglas S. Oles, “No
Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. 471, 474-76 (1978).
53
Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 3.02; see Oles, “No Damage”
Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 476.
54
Andrew D. Ness, Construction Damages, in CONSTRUCTION LAW 255-62 (2001).
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Even delays of short duration can trigger a speedy increase in a
contractor’s project costs. 55 For example, typical contractor delay
damages include the costs associated with increased labor and
materials, 56 extended job-site and home-office overhead, laying off and
rehiring work crews, loss of efficiency of work crews who have to work
around delayed projects, loss of alternative construction job
opportunities, or items such as rental equipment, utilities, and site
securities. 57 Depending upon the nature and cause of the delay, a
contractor may be contractually bound to incur such costs for an
extended period of days, months, or even years beyond that stipulated in
the original contract. 58 Given the numerous possible methods of delay
resulting from the actions of owners and the exponential nature of
damages stemming from delays that do occur, a blanket ban on a
contractor’s ability to recover delay damages represents an “enormous
and almost unquantifiable risk.” 59
Thus, in the absence of an NDFD or alternate exculpatory clause, a
contractor is usually entitled to recover damages associated with ownercaused delays, and the contractor will be granted additional time to
complete its performance when the delay stems from conditions beyond

55

See JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND
DISPUTES 272 (2d ed. 1990); see also W.C. James, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 485 F.2d 22, 23
(10th Cir. 1973) (three-month delay in completion of work on a pipeline construction led to an
alleged $760,875.43 in delay damages); Tonkin Constr. Co. v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 188 Cal. App. 3d
828, 830, 832 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that county was liable for $27,276.08 in costs incurred by
contractor when it was required to perform extra work on a seawall it had constructed due to a twomonth delay in services of county’s dredging contractor).
56
Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at
476 (“Although a standard Changes Clause may provide for compensating the contractor for the
increases in material and labor costs which are directly attributable to the work changed by the
owner, the contractor is likely to incur significant additional damages due to the impact of such
changes in holding up other segments of its work which were not directly changed.”).
57
Eric Berg, No Damages for Delay, in THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS BOOK 117 (2008);
see Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 47677.
58
See, e.g., Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667
(2008) (upholding application of an NDFD Clause following a 223-day delay); Kent v. United
States, 228 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (contractor hired to install an approach lighting system at
J.F.K. International Airport was barred from recovery of an alleged $7,803.40 incurred due to a fourmonth delay stemming from the government’s issuance of a notice to proceed); Am. Bridge Co. v.
State, 283 N.Y.S. 577, 584 (App. Div. 1935) (stating that it was doubtful that an NDFD clause
would be interpreted to bar recovery of damages stemming from delay of nearly 2 years); Endres
Plumbing Corp. v. State, 95 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575, 580 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (finding that a six-month delay
was not so unreasonable as to invalidate an NDFD clause).
59
Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857,
1877 (2005).
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either party’s control. 60 In practice, however, this general rule represents
somewhat of an oversimplification, because the ultimate determination
of liability for delay damages is governed by the agreement between the
parties. 61 “No damage for delay” clauses can be understood in this
context as a contractual tool used by owners to shift virtually all of the
risk of construction-project delays to contractors. 62 The following Part
will explore the common-law and statutory treatment of NDFD clauses.
II.

THE ENFORCEABILITY OF “NO DAMAGE FOR DELAY” CLAUSES

A “no damage for delay” clause exculpates an owner from liability
for damages suffered by a contractor as a result of project delays,
including delays caused by or attributable to the owner or its agents. 63 In
the event of delay, an NDFD clause limits a contractor’s remedy to an
extension of time in which to complete the project. 64 Although NDFD
clauses vary widely in form, a typical example may be worded as
follows:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Contract Documents,
an extension in the Contract Time, to the extent permitted shall be the
sole remedy of the Contractor for any (i) delay in the commencement,
prosecution, or completion of the Work, (ii) hindrance or obstruction
in the performance of the Work, (iii) loss of productivity, or (iv) other
similar claims (collectively referred to in this Subparagraph as
“Delays”) whether or not such Delays are foreseeable, within the
contemplation of the parties, or caused by the acts of the Owner or its
agents. In no event shall the Contractor be entitled to any
60

See PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 5 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 15:29 (2010), available at Westlaw BOCL § 15:29 (explaining that liability
for delay is often assessed based upon a determination of which party “controlled” the timeimpacting event, and providing a general definition of “compensable delay” as “[d]elay caused by
an event within the control of the owner and beyond the control of the contractor, for which the
contractor and its affected subcontractors and suppliers are entitled to an extension of contract time
and damages or an equitable adjustment.”); see also BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN,
CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS § 1.01 (2011), available at Westlaw CNDCL s 1.01 (providing a
detailed discussion of the general principles surrounding excusable, inexcusable, compensable and
non-compensable delays in construction contracts).
61
ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE
CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CDRTC s 16.02.
62
Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages
and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 32 (2002).
63
NDFD clauses have also been incorporated into construction contracts between contractors
and subcontractors, and they have been held to bind subcontractors in some instances through the
application of “flow down” provisions incorporated in prime contracts. Bruner & O’Connor,
CONSTRUCTION LAW at § 3:32; see Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. 667.
64
Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 2.16.
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compensation or recovery of any damages, in connection with any
Delay, including, without limitation, consequential damages, lost
opportunity costs, impact damages, or other similar remuneration. 65

The consequence of a broadly worded NDFD clause is that a contractor
must absorb all of its monetary damages associated with delay, even if
the delay is caused by the actions of the owner or its agents, including
poor site design, interference with the site, or delayed administration. 66
The enforceability of NDFD clauses has been a long-standing topic
of controversy in the legal field due to their exculpatory nature and
frequent scholarly recognition of their potential to cause harsh and
inequitable results. 67 The following section discusses the widely varied
state practices with regard to the enforceability of NDFD clauses.
Notably, NDFD clauses are not included in three widely used standardform construction industry contracts: the American Institute of Architects
(AIA) construction industry documents, ConsensusDocs, and the
Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee. 68 Additionally, the
federal government refrains from including NDFD clauses in its standard
contracts, citing the express purpose of avoiding the inequities associated
with barring a contractor’s recovery of damages associated with
government delay. 69

65

Dean B. Thomson, Legislative Update: No Damage for Delay Clauses Barred,
FABYANSKE, WESTRA, HART & THOMSON, P.A. (May 1, 2002), www.fwhtlaw.com/articles/
legislative_update_no_damage.cfm.
66
Gatlin, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW. at 32; Susan Sisskind Dunne, “No Damage for Delay”
Clauses, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 38 (1999).
67
See, e.g., Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A
Proposed Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1857, 1859 (2005); Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique,
53 WASH. L. REV. 471 (1978); Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in
Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425
(2002); Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 9 (1986); Cordell Parvin, No Damages/Delay Clauses Fair?, 6 ROADS &
BRIDGES 8 (Oct. 1990); Dunne, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW. at 38; see J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia
Davenport, The ‘No Damage for Delay’ Clause: A Public Policy Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 8 (Oct. 2001).
68
Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 2.16 (explaining that AIA
construction industry documents do not preclude recovery by either the owner or the contractor); see
Eric Berg, No Damages for Delay, in THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS HANDBOOK 117 (2008).
69
Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at
489; see Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 2.16 (stating that federal
construction contracts expressly allow for the recovery of delay damages by a contractor under the
suspension clause).
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COMMON-LAW EXCEPTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT

The enforceability of NDFD clauses depends entirely on state law, 70
and in the absence of specific legislation, the varied treatment of NDFD
clauses at common law has led to difficulties for contractors in
determining when they will be enforced. 71 Courts in most jurisdictions
regard NDFD clauses as generally valid contractual provisions 72 but
disfavor their enforcement due to their potential to create harsh and
inequitable results. 73 For this reason, courts strictly construe the
language of NDFD clauses against their drafters. 74 Accordingly, courts
may decline to enforce the most broadly worded forms of NDFD clauses,
such as those purporting to exculpate owners for delays stemming from
“any cause,” because the wording of such clauses is too ambiguous. 75
In addition to the common-law policy of strict construction, a wide
range of well-recognized exceptions may bar enforcement on a case-bycase basis. 76 These exceptions vary by jurisdiction, but they generally
include 1) a delay not covered by the plain language of the clause, 2) a
type of delay not contemplated by the parties when entering into the
agreement, 3) a delay of unreasonable duration, 4) a delay resulting from
the active interference or wrongful conduct by the owner, 5) waiver of
the clause by the actions of the parties, and 6) fundamental breach by the
owner justifying non-enforcement of the clause. 77 The vast majority of
state courts that have considered the issue of NDFD clauses 78 have
70

Berg, No Damage for Delay at 117.
See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1870;
see Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause With
Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 (1976) (providing an
overview of common-law exceptions recognized by state).
72
Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at § 3.
73
Id.; see Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L.
REV. at 479.
74
See Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at § 3.
75
See id. § 5[a].
76
Id. § 7[a] (providing general discussion of commonly recognized judicial exceptions to the
enforcement of an NDFD clause); see Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay”
Clause in Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 425, 446 (2002) (stating that as of 2002, “out of fifty states, forty-eight states either have (1)
passed laws invalidating the clause, (2) recognized that it is not an absolute bar to recovery or (3) not
confronted the issue”).
77
BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS § 2.16
(4th ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CNDCL s 2.16.
78
As of 2008, courts in Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia had never directly considered the enforceability of
NDFD clauses. Construction Law Committee Compendium of Frequently Asked Construction Law
71
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recognized at least one of these judicial exceptions to their
enforcement. 79 However, the real-world application of such exceptions
has been highly inconsistent, 80 leading one commentator to conclude, “If
a court finds enforcing the clause inherently unfair, then it will find an
exception to apply.” 81
For example, while multiple states recognize an exception to the
NDFD clause for delays that are of “unreasonable duration” and
therefore not considered to have been within the contemplation of the
parties, 82 the specific length of time that constitutes an “unreasonable”
delay is subject to court discretion. 83 Thus, the Michigan Court of
Appeal has invalidated an NDFD clause on the grounds that the delay
suffered was of “unreasonable duration” when the contractor suffered a
nine-and-half-month delay on a project originally scheduled for
completion in twenty-four months, 84 while the Supreme Court of
Nebraska has upheld an NDFD clause following a delay of 162 days on a
contract scheduled for completion in 300 days.85 Likewise, inconsistent
holdings have resulted from court applications of the “active
interference” exception, which is applied to bar NDFD clauses when the
delay is due to an owner’s own interference with the work of the
contractor. In applying this exception, a minority of state courts have
invalidated NDFD clauses when the interference resulted from the
owner’s negligence, 86 while others have required a showing of gross
negligence or intentional misconduct. 87
and Professional Liability Related Questions, THE HARMONIE GROUP (May 2008),
www.harmonie.org/user_documents/COMPENDIUM%20FINAL%20WITH%20COVER.pdf.
79
Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 446.
80
Cordell Parvin, ‘No Damages/Delay’ Clauses Fair?, ROADS AND BRIDGES 8 (Oct. 1990)
(“Courts have been all over the map in deciding delay cases where there is a ‘No Damages for
Delay’ provision.”).
81
Id.
82
See Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 2.16.
83
Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857,
1866 (2005).
84
See E.C. Nolan Co. v. State, 227 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
85
See Siefford v. Hous. Auth., 223 N.W.2d 816 (Neb. 1974).
86
Steven B. Lesser & Daniel L. Wallach, Risky Business: The “Active Interference”
Exception to No-Damage-For-Delay Clauses, 23 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 26, 29 (2003); see, e.g.,
Blake Constr. Co. v. C. J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 579 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding active
interference exception applied where owner had provided defective plans to contractor);
Commonwealth of Pa., State Highway & Bridge Auth. v. Gen. Asphalt Paving Co., 405 A.2d 1138,
1141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (holding active interference exception applied where state failed to
grant time extensions to contractor in a timely manner).
87
See Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 2.16; Lesser & Wallach, 23
CONSTRUCTION LAWYER at 26; see, e.g., Gasparini Excavating Co. v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 187 A.2d
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The practical effect of such numerous and inconsistently applied
judicial exceptions is to create uncertainty over whether an NDFD clause
will be enforced by courts; all NDFD clauses walk a thin line between
validation and invalidation, with courts tending to err in favor of
invalidation. 88 It is therefore difficult for parties to predict the
consequences of an NDFD clause included within a building contract. 89
B.

STATUTORY LIMITS ON ENFORCEMENT

In addition to the common-law exceptions, a number of states have
statutorily limited or barred the enforcement of NDFD clauses. 90
Currently, at least twelve states have adopted legislation that limits the
enforceability of NDFD clauses: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington. 91 Of these, Kentucky,92

157, 162, 164 (Pa. 1963) (holding active interference exception applied where owner had ordered
contractor to begin work but denying access to the work area that was occupied by another
contractor); P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 531 A.2d 1330, 1343 (N.J. 1987)
(holding no active interference exception applied due to owner’s failure to adequately coordinate
work of subcontractor).
88
Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 447 (2002).
89
Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857,
1859-60 (2005).
90
Construction Law Committee Compendium of Frequently Asked Construction Law and
Professional Liability Related Questions, THE HARMONIE GROUP (May 2008),
www.harmonie.org/user_documents/COMPENDIUM%20FINAL%20WITH%20COVER.pdf;
Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6 CONSTRUCTION
LAW. 9 (1985-1986).
91
CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (Westlaw 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-91-103.5
(Westlaw 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.405(2)(c) (Westlaw 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
Ch. 30, § 390 (Westlaw 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.411 (Westlaw 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. §
34.058 (Westlaw 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-134.3 (Westlaw 2011), N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:58B-3 (Westlaw 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62 (Westlaw 2011); VA. CODE ANN. §
2.2-4335(A) (Westlaw 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.360 (Westlaw 2011); see Lecusay,
The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call
for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 446, 456-64 (providing general synopsis of
current legislation limiting the enforcement of NDFD clauses by state).
92
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.405(2)(c) (Westlaw 2011) (declaring provisions in
construction contracts void as against public policy if they purport to “waive, release, or extinguish
the right of a contractor or subcontractor to recover costs, additional time, or damages, or obtain an
equitable adjustment of the contract, for delays in performing the contract that are, in whole or part,
within the control of the contracting entity. Unusually bad weather that cannot be reasonably
anticipated, fire, or other act of God shall not automatically entitle the contractor to additional
compensation under this paragraph.”).
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Ohio, 93 and Washington 94 have enacted the most expansive statutes, in
that they render NDFD clauses per se unenforceable in public and private
contracts under certain conditions. 95 In fact, the number of states that
have chosen to enact formal legislation limiting the enforceability of
NDFD clauses has more than quadrupled since California first enacted its
Public Contract Code section 7102 in 1985. 96 Indeed, it appears that
“[l]egislation against the NDFD clause is in; passing the buck is not.” 97
Perhaps this trend evidences a growth in state recognition that such
clauses represent a public policy concern. 98
93

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62(C) (Westlaw 2011) (“(1) Any provision of a
construction contract, agreement, or understanding, or specification or other documentation that is
made a part of a construction contract, agreement, or understanding, that waives or precludes
liability for delay during the course of a construction contract when the cause of the delay is a
proximate result of the owner’s act or failure to act, or that waives any other remedy for a
construction contract when the cause of the delay is a proximate result of the owner’s act or failure
to act, is void and unenforceable as against public policy. (2) Any provision of a construction
subcontract, agreement, or understanding, or specification or other documentation that is made part
of a construction subcontract, agreement, or understanding, that waives or precludes liability for
delay during the course of a construction subcontract when the cause of the delay is a proximate
result of the owner’s or contractor’s act or failure to act, or that waives any other remedy for a
construction subcontract when the cause of the delay is a proximate result of the owner’s or
contractor’s act or failure to act, is void and unenforceable as against public policy.”).
94
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.360 (Westlaw 2011) (“Any clause in a construction
contract, as defined in RCW 4.24.370, which purports to waive, release, or extinguish the rights of a
contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to damages or an equitable adjustment arising out of
unreasonable delay in performance which delay is caused by the acts or omissions of the contractee
or persons acting for the contractee is against public policy and is void and unenforceable. This
section shall not be construed to void any provision in a construction contract, as defined in RCW
4.24.370, which (1) requires notice of delays, (2) provides for arbitration or other procedure for
settlement, or (3) provides for reasonable liquidated damages.”).
95
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62 (Westlaw 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.360
(Westlaw 2011).
96
See ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE
CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CDRTC s 16.02 (stating that Colorado,
California, Massachusetts, and Washington were the first states to enact statutes addressing NDFD
clauses); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.405(c) (Westlaw 2011) (enacted in 2007); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 15.411 (Westlaw 2011) (enacted in 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62
(Westlaw 2011) (enacted in 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4335(A) (Westlaw 2011) (enacted in
2001).
97
Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 446 (2002); see
also Cushman, CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR at 496 (“[T]he recent
surge of activity in state legislatures in an effort to restrict or preclude enforcement of the ‘no
damage for delay’ clauses in public construction contracts indicates that the pendulum is starting to
swing back and treat the construction industry with more fairness.”).
98
Other states have recently attempted to pass legislation limiting the enforceability of
NDFD clauses as well. Notably, the New York Legislature passed a bill limiting the enforceability
of NDFD clauses in 1998. However, the bill was ultimately vetoed by the governor, despite his
express agreement with the central purpose and intent of the bill. Contractors renewed their efforts.
Henry L. Goldbert, Albany Eyes Damages for Delay in Public Works, LAW/COURTROOM NEWS
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III. POLICY ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE ENFORCEMENT OF “NO
DAMAGE FOR DELAY” CLAUSES
The enforceability of NDFD clauses has been a subject of
longstanding debate. This Part reviews a number of core arguments and
policy concerns advanced by both sides of the controversy and concludes
that NDFD clauses should not be enforced because of their 1) potential to
result in harsh and inequitable consequences that are disfavored by
common law, 2) inherent inefficiency as tools for apportioning the risks
of delay in construction contracts, and 3) potential unconscionability.
A.

FREEDOM TO CONTRACT

Proponents of NDFD clauses commonly rely upon the policy of
freedom to contract, a principle long idealized in American
jurisprudence. 99 This argument is based on the premise that at the time
of contracting, both parties are aware of risks associated with delay in
construction contracts and should be allowed to bargain between
themselves to apportion these risks in a manner that they deem most
beneficial. 100 Proponents assert that contractors are sophisticated
business parties who can bargain during the bidding process for the
inclusion of other favorable terms or a higher rate for their services as
required to adequately shield themselves from the risks associated with
NDFD clauses. 101 However, “freedom to contract” is not an absolute
concept and is often limited through legislative and judicial restrictions
applied to protect public interests. 102 Opponents have effectively
(July 2006), http://newyork.construction.com/opinions/law/archive/2006/07.asp; see Cushman,
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR at 496 (stating that the 1998 NY bill
provided compensation for excusable delay which was defined as “(1) the cause of the delay arises
after award of the public contract and was caused by the public owner’s acts or omissions and/or is
attributable to changed conditions or differing site or subsurface conditions; (2) the contractor,
subcontractor, or materialman demonstrates that completion of the work or delivery of material will
be actually and necessarily delayed; (3) the effect of such cause cannot be avoided or mitigated by
the exercise of all reasonable precautions efforts and measures whether before or after the
occurrence of the cause of the delay; and (4) the contractor, subcontractor or materialman properly
submits notice to the public owner in accordance with the provisions of the public contract.”).
99
Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857,
1870 (2005).
100
See id. at 1870-73.
101
See id.
102
8 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law § 1070 (10th ed. 2005),
available at Westlaw 8 WITSUM Ch. X, § 1070 (stating that while some older cases have asserted
that freedom to contract is the rule, and restrain the exception, this position has been abandoned; this
is especially true in contracts regarding terms of employer-employee relations); see 16A C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 721 (2011) (“Liberty to contract is not an absolute right, but is qualified and
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attacked the “freedom to contract” argument on the basis that enforcing
NDFD clauses, especially in instances of owner-caused delay, is contrary
to public policy interests. 103
Opponents urge that the “freedom to contract” argument is overly
simplistic when applied to NDFD clauses because it assumes a system in
which both parties possess equal power to bargain for the terms most
favorable to them. Proponents suggest that a contractor can protect itself
from the risk of delay by increasing its bid for the project to account for
the possibility of future delays. 104 This may not be the case with regard
to NDFD clauses in construction contracts. Rather, the bargaining power
of contractors with regard to an NDFD clause may be severely eroded by
both the competitive bidding process 105 and the inherent difficulty of
predicting the significance of such clauses at the time of contracting.106
As discussed previously, most public and many private construction
projects are secured through competitive bidding. 107 In this system,
limited by the legitimate supervision of the government. The right is subject to regulations or
restrictions that are reasonable in light of the purposes to be accomplished. Liberty of contract may
be limited, restrained, and circumscribed in order to protect an overriding public interest.”).
103
J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia E. Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A Public
Policy Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 12 (Oct. 2001) (“It is the policy of the law, generally, to furnish everyone
with legal remedies for any injuries received. Accordingly, a no damage for delay clause which on
its face imposes a penalty on a contractor by denying a legal remedy, while excusing owner default,
is contrary to public policy.”); Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in
Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425,
456 (2002) (“Is the public really interested in allowing—as a matter of policy—one party to ‘sell’ to
another responsibility for delay caused by the same party just because there should be freedom to
contract, where the ‘buying’ party must either take the contract or leave it, and close its doors?”); see
Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV.
471, 497 (1978) (“Because ‘no damage’ clauses are either unnecessary to bar a contractor’s recovery
when delays are foreseeable, or impose an unreasonable burden on a contractor when delays are
unforeseeable, equity would best be served by denying them any operative effect.”).
104
Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages
and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW at 32 (2002).
105
See Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L.
REV. at 482; Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 432-36.
106
See Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857,
1877-78 (2005).
107
See PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 2:22 (2011), available at Westlaw BOCL § 2:22 (explaining that the process
of sealed competitive bidding is mandated almost universally by statute in public construction
contracts, but is not widely used in private construction contracts. Yet, “[e]ven where the prime
contract is negotiated . . . trade subcontracts frequently are awarded through sealed bidding.
Therefore, some form of competitive sealed bidding also continues to be well accepted in both
international public works and private contracting.”); JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA DOCUMENTS 252 (2009), available at Westlaw
SCICA s 9.07 (“Generally, public contracts must be awarded on the basis of competitive bidding.
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owners typically occupy a much stronger bargaining position than the
contractors, who are under pressure to place low bids in order to secure
projects. 108 In fact, a competitive bidding process may leave contractors
with no meaningful opportunity to bargain for alternate terms. 109 As one
commentator observed:
[A] contractor may not generally negotiate with regard to the specific
terms of the contract. He must either submit a bid on the contract as
offered to the public or simply refrain from bidding. . . . Of course, it
might be argued that a contractor can always go elsewhere and bid on
work which is advertised with more favorable contract terms, but
where exculpatory provisions such as “no damage” clauses are
commonly in use and held valid, it may become difficult to obtain
sufficient contract work not imposing such conditions. 110

A number of commentators have recognized the weak bargaining
position of contractors involved in statutorily mandated sealed
A contractor that includes a
competitive bidding processes. 111
contingency for delay damages associated with the NDFD clause in its
bid may not receive the job if other contractors elect to bid without a
contingency. 112 The competitive bidding process thus undermines the
central premise of the “freedom to contract” argument: that the parties
will be able to effectively bargain between themselves for the most
favorable terms.
Even most private contracts, with the option of bidding or negotiating, are awarded after competitive
bidding. Only experienced owners, who must deal with a small number of contractors, perhaps only
one, with the technical skill needed, are likely to use negotiation.”); KENNETH C. GIBBS & GORDON
HUNT, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW 71 (16th ed. 2000).
108
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1872.
109
See id.
110
Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at
482.
111
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1872 (“In reality,
owners occupy a much stronger bargaining position than the contractors who work for them. In
many cases the bidding contractors have no choice but to accept no damages for delay clauses and
other owner-friendly contract provisions if they wish to participate in the work.”); Cheri Turnage
Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages and Judicial Enforcement
of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW at 32 (2002) (“Recognizing that contractors cannot
practically protect themselves with contingency bidding, courts strictly construe no-damage-fordelay clauses and give only restrained approval.”); see Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction
Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 482; Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for
Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 425, 432-36 (2002).
112
Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages and Judicial
Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW at 32.
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Furthermore, a contractor’s ability to effectively bargain concerning
the inclusion of NDFD clauses is undermined by the enormous difficulty
of predicting both the enforceability of such clauses and estimating their
potential future impacts if they are enforced. 113 As discussed previously,
the statutory limitations on the enforcement of NDFD clauses,
considered in tandem with the myriad state-specific judicial exceptions,
render the ultimate enforceability of an NDFD anything but certain.114
As Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham illustrates, a contractor’s inability to
accurately predict at the time of contracting whether an NDFD clause
will be enforced can have steep financial consequences. 115
Additionally, the “freedom to contract” argument assumes that a
contractor is able to weigh the risk of project delays and respond by
bargaining for a sufficient contingency amount in the initial project
estimates. 116 Yet the enormity of liability associated with any and all
potential project delays, including those caused by an owner or its agents
and thus outside of the contractor’s control, may be beyond
calculation. 117 In reality, “the risk of delay is an enormous issue in
construction, and the proof and calculation of delay damages can be
extraordinarily challenging, even after a delay has occurred. . . . [A]
blanket ban on recovery under a no damages for delay clause is an
enormous and almost unquantifiable risk.” 118 Even if contractors were
113

See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1884;
cf. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 487
(“[E]nforcement of a ‘no damage’ clause may have the oppressive effect of forcing a contractor to
gamble on the quality of the owner’s specifications, the owner’s promptness in contract
administration, and the owner’s moderation in exercising authority under the Changes Clause, since
delay damages arising from the owner’s failures in these areas may be held nonrecoverable.”).
114
See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1870
(“The question of whether any given no damages for delay clause is judicially enforceable is
ultimately a very difficult one. . . . In most states, however, confusion continues to be the rule and
certainty the exception.”).
115
Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667, 670 (2008)
(noting that KCI’s general manager who signed the subcontract later testified that KCI had believed
the NDFD clause to be “a boilerplate phrase that’s contained in most contracts that’s generally
ignored because it’s not enforceable”).
116
See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1872.
117
See id. at 1884; Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages
and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW at 32.
118
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1877; see also
Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 468 (2002) (“Proponents
claim that the clause affords an opportunity to know upfront what the costs of delays will be in order
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able to accurately predict the future enforcement of NDFD clauses, it
remains unlikely that they could effectively bargain to protect themselves
from the liability associated with owner-caused delays. 119 The inability
of contractors to bargain effectively to protect themselves against the farreaching financial risks associated with NDFD clauses thus undermines
proponents’ “freedom to contract” argument.
B.

FAIRNESS

The fairness of enforcing NDFD clauses has been a subject of
heated debate. 120 Proponents argue that NDFD clauses are valuable tools
for protecting an owner’s ability to accurately project costs at the time of
contracting. 121 Proponents also suggest that NDFD clauses prevent
contractors from making vexatious claims that result in costly litigation,
compromising the economics and administration of the project. 122 The
policy goals underlying this argument are the strongest in the context of a
public works contract, given the public interest in protecting public tax
dollars against “vexatious litigation based on claims, real or fancied, that
the agency has been responsible for unreasonable delays.” 123 However,
when private parties enter agreements involving NDFD clauses, there is
less public interest to protect through limiting litigation. 124 Additionally,
proponents suggest that the use of NDFD clauses discourages contractors
from causing project delays due to the knowledge that they will not be
able to seek monetary compensation. 125
In contrast, opponents of NDFD clauses have strongly criticized the
provisions as unfair “draconian” tools that result in harsh

to better manage limited public funds. But this is a mirage. It is improbable, if not impossible, to
accurately forecast delay events to any degree of mathematical certainty.”).
119
See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1877.
120
See id. at 1859 (“No damages for delay clauses in construction contracts have always been
very controversial.”); see Cordell Parvin, No Damages/Delay Clauses Fair?, ROADS & BRIDGES 8
(Oct. 1990). But see David P. Gontar, The Enforceability of “No Damages for Delay” Clauses in
Construction Contracts, 28 LOY. L. REV. 129 (1982).
121
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1871.
122
Id.; J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia E. Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A
Public Policy Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 8 (Oct. 2001).
123
Gontar, The Enforceability of “No Damages for Delay” Clauses in Construction
Contracts, 28 LOY. L. REV. at 130 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
124
Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH.
L. REV. 471, 488 n.70 (1978).
125
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1871.
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consequences. 126 The significance of uncompensated damages incurred
by a contractor due to the enforcement of an NDFD clause was
previously noted with regard to the California case of Harper/NielsenDillingham. 127 In addition, literature analyzing the application of NDFD
clauses is abundant with cases illustrating the potentially devastating
consequences of NDFD clauses. 128 For example, the enforcement of an
NDFD clause barred a New York contractor from seeking an estimated
$3,311,960 in damages that it had incurred over a twenty-eight-month
delay allegedly caused by the City’s “endless” revision of plans and
failure to coordinate activities of prime contractors. 129 Similarly, an
NDFD clause has been applied to bar a Texas contractor from recovering
an estimated $5,108,765.50 in damages that it had incurred due to an
approximately two-year delay that allegedly resulted from the City’s
issuance of several hundred changes to the original plans. 130
In addition to the potentially harsh results induced by NDFD
clauses, several commentators have called attention to the unfairness of
broadly worded NDFD clauses that exonerate owners from all liability
associated with negligent or even willful actions, while providing no
remedy for contractors even if they have clearly been wronged. 131 The
enforcement of such clauses is contrary to the well-recognized public
policy that courts should not interpret a contract so as to put one party at
the mercy of another’s negligence. 132 Although owners have a valid
interest in protecting themselves from project delays and vexatious
litigation, “to suppose for the moment that owners themselves can be

126

Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 427 (2002); see
Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause With Respect
to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 § 3 (1976) (“[B]ecause of the harsh
results often induced by the ‘no damage for delay’ clause, such clause is given strict
construction . . . .”).
127
Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667, 669 (2008)
(finding an NDFD clause barred subcontractor from asserting a claim against the federal
government for estimated delay damages of $770,565.00, an amount greater than the original
contract price).
128
See, e.g., Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 (providing analysis of multi-jurisdictional NDFD case
precedent); Richard Gary Thomas & Fred D. Wilshusen, How to Beat a ‘No Damage for Delay’
Clause, 9 CONSTRUCTION LAW 17, 22 (1989).
129
Kalish-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 448 N.E.2d 413, 414-15 (N.Y. 1983).
130
City of Houston v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 570 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 14th Dist.
1978).
131
Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 441.
132
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 284 (2011); see Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in
Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. 471, 481 (1978).
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excused for delays occasioned by their own behavior entirely misses the
mark on the purpose for the clause.” 133
Finally, NDFD clauses are unfair in application. 134 They are
typically one-sided instruments that bar contractors from collecting
monetary damages stemming from delay attributable to others, while
placing no similar limitation on owners. 135 The contractor’s only remedy
is an extension of the time for performance, which is “wholly inadequate
because it fails to recognize that any delay will render the contractor’s
performance more expensive.” 136 Although a standard Changes Clause
provides for compensating the contractor for additional material and
labor costs that are directly attributable to changes in the work, a delayed
contractor will likely be forced to absorb a range of uncompensated costs
while waiting to complete the project. 137 For example, a delayed
contractor may need to pay additional money to retain its workforce
during the delay period or may incur damages as a result of lost
alternative opportunities for employment. 138
The unjust results of enforcing NDFD clauses are particularly
apparent in contracts that also contain liquidated damages clauses, which
protect owners from damages associated with the delay of contractors. 139
A liquidated damages clause requires the contractor to pay the owner a
133

J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia E. Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A Public
Policy Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 8 (Oct. 2001).
134
Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 442 (noting that NDFD clauses
have been applied to bar contractors from obtaining damages even when the associated delay was
due to deliberate owner interference.); Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A
Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 497 (“The operative effect of a ‘no damage’ clause is to bar a
contractor from recovering impact damages arising from unforeseeable delays which are attributable
to the owner. When it is so enforced, the clause works the oppressive effect of subjecting a
contractor to broad and uncertain liability for which it cannot adequately provide in its bid.”);
Grandoff & Davenport, FLA. B. J. at 12 ( “A no damage for delay clause which on its face imposes a
penalty on a contractor by denying a legal remedy, while excusing owner default, is contrary to
public policy.”).
135
Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 441.
136
Robert A. Rubin, Summaries of Debate at the April 28 Fourth Annual Meeting of the ABA
Forum Committee on the Construction Industry Held at Tampa, Florida, 8 CONSTRUCTION LAW 41
(1988) (summarizing Robert A. Rubin’s presentation: “No Damage for Delay”—Fair or Foul? The
Contractor’s Perspective).
137
Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at
476-77.
138
Id.
139
See Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 437-40; see Oles,
“No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 491; Carl S.
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative to the
Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 1873 (2005).
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fixed amount of money per day for each day a project is delayed.140
Although liquidated damages clauses have a similar purpose to NDFD
clauses, a liquidated damages clause will not be enforced by courts if it is
determined to be unreasonable at the time of contracting. 141 By contrast,
NDFD clauses—which relieve owners of all liability for damages
associated with their own delays—have been enforced by courts
regardless of their reasonableness. 142 As commentator Alain Lecusay
explained in his 2002 article on NDFD clauses in Florida:
When a contractor delays a project, the owner collects damages from
the guilty contractor by invoking the “Liquidated Damages” clause
(“LDC”). The LDC seeks to compensate an owner who cannot make
beneficial use of the project because the contractor has not completed
the work. When an owner delays a project, however, the guilty owner
does not have to pay the contractor. The owner, instead, raises a
shield and says to the contractor, “I don’t have to pay you even if I
delayed this job.” 143

A construction contract containing both an NDFD and liquidated
damages clause is unfair in that it creates a legal double standard; a
contractor remains liable for damages associated with its own delays,
while the owner is not. 144 An NDFD clause operates in a similar manner
to a liquidated damages provision, but it is not governed by any of the
same reasonableness restrictions that apply to liquidated damages
provisions as a matter of law. 145 The inherent unfairness present in such
situations, coupled with the high risk of forfeiture associated with NDFD
clauses, should lead legislators to render NDFD clauses void as against
public policy in all construction contracts when the owner causes delay.
140

RICHARD A. HOLDERNESS, HANDLING DISPUTES DURING CONSTRUCTION: HERE’S HOW
51 (2006).
141
Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at

AND WHEN TO DO IT

491.
142

See Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause
With Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 § 7[a] (1976) (“So
long as the basic requirements for a valid contract are met, the ‘no damage’ clause is binding and
generally will be enforced according to its terms. . . .”). But see Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in
Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 492 (arguing that “a ‘no damage’ provision
in a construction contract is analogous to a liquidated damage provision. As a result, the former
ought to be invalidated whenever it fails to meet the test of ‘reasonable forecast of just
compensation . . . breach’ which limits the enforcement of [liquidated damage provisions].”).
143
Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 437.
144
See id. at 437-38.
145
See Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 15 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. at 437-40.
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UNCONSCIONABILITY

In addition to general policy concerns over the fairness of NDFD
clauses, opponents of NDFD clauses have argued that they may operate
as unconscionable provisions. 146 It is a well-established principle of
common law that courts may refuse to enforce a contractual provision
that is unconscionable due to “an absence of meaningful choice on the
part of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.” 147 In California, this doctrine has been
codified in California Civil Code section 1670.5. 148 In order for a
contractual provision to be deemed unconscionable, courts require a
showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.149
Procedural unconscionability is evident when the circumstances
surrounding the formation of a contract involve “an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties.” 150 Substantive
unconscionability is present where the contract terms are “unreasonably
favorable” to one party. 151 Furthermore, a showing of procedural and
substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same extent in

146

Id. at 480 (arguing that “when the effect of a ‘no damage’ clause is to impose such an
unreasonable liability on the contractor as to be oppressive, a court might . . . invoke the rule against
unconscionability” as a means of attacking their enforcement.); Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the
Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative the Inadequate “No Damages for
Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 1873 (2005) (“[S]ome argue that it is
unconscionable for owners and general contractors to exculpate themselves ahead of time for the
costs of delays they cause contractors.”).
147
Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV at
481 n.44 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
148
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (Westlaw 2011) (providing that “[i]f the court as a matter of
law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result.”).
149
14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts § 15 (2012), available at Westlaw CALJUR CONTRACTS §
15.
150
Williams, 350 F.2d at 449 (“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”); see also 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts § 16 (“For purposes
of determining whether a contract provision is unconscionable, the procedural element of the
unconscionability analysis concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the
circumstances of the parties at that time; the element focuses on oppression or surprise. Oppression
arises from the inequality of bargaining power that results in no real negotiation and an absence of
meaningful choice.” (footnotes omitted)).
151
Williams, 350 F.2d at 449; see also 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts § 17 (“Substantively
unconscionable terms may take various forms, but may generally be described as unfairly one-sided.
Substantive unconscionability focuses on the terms of the parties’ agreement and whether those
terms are overly harsh, or are so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience.’” (footnotes omitted)).
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order for a court to invalidate a contractual provision. 152 California
courts apply a sliding-scale analysis in that “[t]he more substantively
oppressive the contract term the less evidence of procedural
unconscionability is required to support the conclusion that the term is
unenforceable, and vice versa.” 153
On a procedural level, scholars have observed that owners typically
occupy a stronger bargaining position than contractors, 154 which
undermines the ability of contractors to meaningfully negotiate over
unfavorable terms. 155 In contrast, proponents of NDFD clauses have
asserted that procedural unconscionability arguments are not applicable
to most construction contracts because of the sophisticated and businesssavvy nature of professional contractors. 156 However, scholars have
noted that the opportunity for meaningful bargaining in both private and
public construction contracts has been significantly eroded in recent
years by the prevalent use of form contracts and the emergence of strong
economic forces that are more readily capable of dictating contractual
terms to smaller independent contractors and subcontractors. 157
Furthermore, even the significant commercial knowledge and experience
of most contractors would likely fail to even the scales of power in the
negotiation of many public and private construction contracts, due to the
inherent “absence of meaningful choice” in the competitive bidding
process previously discussed. 158 Thus, contractors in many public and

152

14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts at § 15.
Id.
154
See Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857,
1872 (2005); see also Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A
Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. 471, 482 (1978); JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA DOCUMENTS 12 (2011), available at Westlaw SCICA § 1.06
(stating that AIA construction industry documents generally assume that “the owner has greater
bargaining power than the prime contractor, and that the prime contractor has greater power than
subcontractors”).
155
See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1872
(“In many cases the bidding contractors have no choice but to accept no damages for delay clauses
and other owner-friendly contract provisions if they wish to participate in the work.”).
156
David P. Gontar, The Enforceability of “No Damage for Delay” Clauses in Construction
Contracts, 28 LOY. L. REV. 129, 140 (1982).
157
See JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 20 (1970) (“[F]reedom of contract assumes two parties of relatively equal
bargaining power who jointly negotiate an agreement. Through the development of mass produced
contracts and the emergence of large blocs of economic power, this earlier model of the negotiated
contract has become the exception.”).
158
Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at
482-83.
153
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private contracts may have a strong argument for procedural
unconscionability.
On a substantive level, a strong argument exists that NDFD clauses
unreasonably favor the contractual interests of owners over those of
contractors. First, NDFD clauses are inherently one-sided instruments
that bar contractors from recovering in the event of owner-caused delay
but provide no reciprocal bar upon the owners’ ability to seek damages in
the event of contractor-caused delay. 159 The one-sided nature of NDFD
clauses is relevant because courts have considered lack of mutuality in
contractual terms as a basis for determining substantive
unconscionability. 160
Second, broadly worded NDFD clauses unreasonably favor the
interests of owners over those of contractors, by requiring contractors to
absorb substantial uncompensated delay damages, even when such delay
is the result of an owner’s negligent or unreasonable acts. 161 In addition,
NDFD clauses are inherently unreasonable by virtue of the fact that they
offer no real consideration to contractors in exchange for their waiver of
remedies, and instead place them in a position of “bargaining” for rights
they already possess. 162 Proponents of NDFD clauses argue that they
evidence a meaningful bargain between the parties because the
contractor is forgoing its right to recover damages in exchange for a right
to a time extension equal to the length of the delay. 163 However, this
argument ignores the “generally accepted principle of law that a party
delaying the performance of a contract may not, even in the absence of
an express term granting time extension, charge the contractor with the
time damages for consequent delay.” 164 In effect, NDFD clauses force
contractors to abandon their general right to recover damages caused by
the delay of others, while providing no value in return.
In summary, NDFD clauses have strong potential to operate as
unconscionable provisions because they are unreasonably favorable to

159

Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 441 (2002)
(“But for a rare occasion, the NDFD clause does not apply to damages that an owner may incur from
delays caused by a contractor.”).
160
See 14 CAL. JUR. 3D. Contracts §17 (2012), available at Westlaw CALJUR CONTRACTS
§ 17.
161
See Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 15 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. at 441.
162
Id. at 482-83.
163
Id. at 482.
164
Id. at 483.
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owners 165 and are commonly forced upon contractors through a
competitive bidding process in which they have no meaningful
opportunity to bargain. 166
D.

RISK APPORTIONMENT

Regardless of their potential inequities, NDFD clauses should not be
enforced because they do not fulfill their intended function of efficiently
apportioning the risks associated with delay in construction contracts. 167
As previously noted, it is nearly impossible for a contractor to anticipate
and accurately calculate monetary losses associated with a virtually
infinite list of potential project delays, especially those caused by
others. 168 The modern construction process is inherently complex, and
delay could stem from the failure of any party involved in the project to
perform by the agreed-upon time. 169 Thus, the vast majority of costs
associated with delays, especially those stemming from the actions of
parties other than the contractor, are not within the contemplation of the
contractor at the time of contracting. As one scholar noted:
[T]he risk of delay is an enormous issue in construction, and the proof
and calculation of delay damages can be extraordinarily challenging,
even after a delay has occurred. Because delay claims can potentially
have huge economic impacts on owners and contractors alike, a
blanket ban on recovery under a no damages for delay clause is an
enormous and almost unquantifiable risk. 170

It is therefore unreasonable to expect contractors to adequately protect
themselves from the risk of forfeiture associated with such losses by

165

See Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 441 (2002).
166
See Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857,
1872 (2005); Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages
and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW 32 (2002); see Oles, “No
Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 482; Lecusay, The
Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for
Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 432-36.
167
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1884.
168
Id. at 1877.
169
S. GREGORY JOY, EUGENE J. HEADY & JAMES E. STEPHENSON, ALTERNATIVE CLAUSES
TO STANDARD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 7 (2010), available at Westlaw ACSCC s 1.02.
170
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1877.
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bargaining for an increased fee at the time of contracting; inequitable
outcomes of such a practice are inevitable. 171
Even if a contractor were in a position to effectively bargain at the
inception of a project regarding potential delay damages, it would likely
be unable to appreciate the significance of an NDFD clause due to the
uncertainty of its enforcement. 172 As noted above, because NDFD
clauses are exculpatory in nature, the majority of courts strictly construe
them against their drafters. 173 Some states have limited or prohibited the
enforcement of NDFD clauses by statute. 174 In states where NDFD
provisions are not per se unenforceable, several widely recognized
judicial exceptions make the outcome of litigation uncertain. 175
Therefore, contractors cannot be expected to accurately anticipate the
enforceability of NDFD clauses and to weigh their value accordingly in
the bargaining process.
Fortunately, there is little need for states to continue enforcing
NDFD clauses, given the availability of other widely accepted practices
that can be used by parties to apportion delay risks and that do not result
in total forfeiture. For example, a method similar to the liquidated
damages clause could also be used by contractors as against ownercaused delays. 176 Effectively crafted liquidated damages clauses would
give the parties a clear means of predicting their potential liabilities at the
time of contracting and would simplify any future litigation.177 A
liquidated damages clause could be structured to include a cap on the
total amount of delay damages recoverable. 178 This method would have
many of the advantages of a standard liquidated damages clause, while
providing additional protection for owners by allowing them to

171

See id. at 1877-78.
See id. at 1870.
173
Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause With
Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 § 3 (1976).
174
Construction Law Committee Compendium of Frequently Asked Construction Law and
Professional Liability Related Questions, THE HARMONIE GROUP (May 2008),
www.harmonie.org/user_documents/COMPENDIUM%20FINAL%20WITH%20COVER.pdf;
Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6 CONSTRUCTION
LAW 9 (1985-1986).
175
Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at § 7[a].
176
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1879; see Cheri
Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages and Judicial
Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW 32, 36 (2002).
177
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1879-81.
178
Id. at 1880-81.
172
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determine their maximum liability for delay at the start of the project. 179
Because such modified liquidated damages clauses do not cause total
forfeiture, they have been subject to less judicial scrutiny than NDFD
clauses and are commonly enforced by courts. 180
Alternately, owners could place corridor provisions in their
contracts, 181 which function in essentially the opposite manner as a
liquidated damages clause with a cap. 182 A corridor provision allows the
contractor to recover for delay damages, but only for delays beyond a
specified period. 183 Put simply, the contractor would not be able to
recover delay damages until the delay had reached a certain number of
days. 184 For example, a corridor provision may be drafted that entitles a
contractor to compensation for any delays in excess of thirty days, but no
compensation for shorter delays. This type of clause would function to
protect a contractor in the event of significant delays, while still
providing incentive to the contractor to avoid short-term delays for which
it could not recover. 185 Given such viable alternative techniques for
apportioning delay risks in construction contracts, it appears that the
elimination of the unfair and inefficient NDFD clause would not
significantly affect the parties’ freedom to contract.
IV. CALIFORNIA’S TREATMENT OF “NO DAMAGE FOR DELAY”
CLAUSES
Effective January 1, 1985, the California legislature enacted
California Public Contract Code section 7102, rendering an NDFD
clause unenforceable in a public works contract when the delay is the
fault of the owner, unreasonable under the circumstances involved, and

179

Id.
5 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 15:81 (2010), available at Westlaw
BOCL § 15:81.
181
These clauses have also been referred to as “elimination periods.” Beattie, Apportioning
the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages
for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1881.
182
Id.; see Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay
Damages and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW 32, 36 (2002).
183
See Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages and Judicial
Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW at 36.
184
Id. (observing that a typical elimination clause may read, “The contractor shall be entitled
to compensation for any delays in excess of 45 days caused by the Owner, Architect, Construction
Manager, by the employee of any of them, by a separate contractor employed by the Owner, by
changes in the work.”).
185
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1881.
180
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not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. 186
Under these circumstances, section 7102 authorizes a contractor to
recover monetary damages associated with delay in spite of the presence
of an NDFD clause in a public agency’s prime contract and
subcontracts. 187 The statute has no effect on the validity of provisions in
California construction contracts that require notice of delay or provide
for liquidated damages for delay. 188 Rather, California courts allow
liquidated damages provisions in construction contracts 189 and even
require them in certain public works contracts. 190 Section 7102 was
enacted to bring the California Public Contract Code in line with
common-law treatment of NDFD clauses, under which “California
construction lawyers have long felt that a ‘no damage for delay’ clause
would not be enforced where unreasonable delays have been caused by
the project owner.” 191
In addition to the statutory limitations contained within section
7102, California courts have also recognized several judicial exceptions
to the enforceability of NDFD clauses. 192 These exceptions include
where the contractor’s claim is the result of 1) unreasonable delay, 193 2) a
type of delay that was not contemplated by the parties, 194 or 3) an
186

CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (Westlaw 2011) (“Contract provisions in construction
contracts of public agencies and subcontracts thereunder which limit the contractee’s liability to an
extension of time for delay for which the contractee is responsible and which delay is unreasonable
under the circumstances involved, and not within the contemplation of the parties, shall not be
construed to preclude the recovery of damages by the contractor or subcontractor. No public agency
may require the waiver, alteration, or limitation of the applicability of this section. Any such waiver,
alteration, or limitation is void. This section shall not be construed to void any provision in a
construction contract which requires notice of delays, provides for arbitration or other procedure for
settlement, or provides for liquidated damages.”).
187
JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND
DISPUTES 277 (2d ed. 1990); see JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 7:90
(6th ed. 2004), available at Westlaw CACLM § 7:90 (noting that statute has no effect on the validity
of provisions in California construction contracts that require notice of delay or provide for
liquidated damages for delay).
188
See Acret, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL at § 7.90.
189
Acret, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE at 224.
190
See PUB. CONT. §§ 10105, 10226 (requiring the inclusion of liquidated damages clauses
for the contractor’s delay in every construction contract whose cost exceeds $250,000); see RICHARD
A. HOLDERNESS, HANDLING DISPUTES DURING CONSTRUCTION: HERE’S HOW AND WHEN TO DO IT
51 (2006).
191
Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6
CONSTRUCTION LAW 9, 10 (1985-1986).
192
Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause With
Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 § 7[a] (1976).
193
See Hawley v. Orange Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 27 Cal. Rptr. 478, 484 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963); Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at § 7[i].
194
Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 187, 190 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Hawley,
27 Cal. Rptr. 478; Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at §7[i].
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owner’s breach of contract. 195 The perception of contractors that NDFD
clauses will not be universally enforced under California common law is
supported by the existence of three other California statutes that affect
their enforceability: 1) California Civil Code section 2782(b), which
voids all provisions in construction contracts with public agencies that
intend to impose on a contractor, or relieve a public agency from,
liability for the active negligence of a public agency; 196 2) California
Civil Code section 1670.5, which provides that California courts may not
enforce contractual provisions that are held to be unconscionable; 197 and
3) California Civil Code section 1442, which provides that California
“courts must strictly construe forfeiture provisions [of a contract] against
the party on whose behalf they are invoked.” 198
Although California was among the first states to enact legislation
limiting the enforceability of NDFD clauses, section 7102 provides only
limited protection for California contractors against application of the
unfair and inefficient “no damage for delay” clause. 199 The California
legislature should therefore follow the example of a growing number of
states that have responded to public policy concerns by enacting broader
legislation to limit the enforcement of NDFD clauses. 200
One significant limitation of section 7102 is its restricted
application only to construction contracts involving a “public agency,” a
term defined elsewhere in the Code to mean state and local government
The California legislature has been silent as to the
entities. 201
enforceability of NDFD clauses in private construction contracts, despite
the fact that many of the same policy concerns apply to private and
public contracts alike. The legislature’s failure to address the issue of
NDFD clauses in private contracts was due to the fact that the passage of
195

Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at § 7[f] .
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782(b) (Westlaw 2011).
197
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (Westlaw 2011); JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO
CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES 277 (2d ed. 1990).
198
Milenbach v. Comm’r, 318 F.3d 924, 936 (9th Cir. 2003); Richard A. Lord, Conditions
and Promises Which Would Cause a Forfeiture or Penalty, in 14 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 42:2
(4th ed. 2010), available at Westlaw WILLSTN-CN § 42:2.
199
See Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 446, 456-64
(2002) (providing a survey of state legislation limiting the enforceability of NDFD clauses).
200
See id. at 455-64.
201
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 4401 (Westlaw 2011) (“‘Public agency,’ as defined in this chapter,
includes the State, its various commissions, boards and departments and any county, city, district or
state agency authorized to enter into contracts for public work.”); see Marc M. Schneier, Severin
Doctrine Bars Subcontractor’s Pass-Through Claim, Because Under California Law a ‘No
Damages for Delay’ Clause Shields the Prime Contractor from Liability to the Sub, in 30 NO.1
CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION REPORTER 15 (2009).
196
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section 7102 was intended to simply codify what were already wellrecognized judicial exceptions to the enforcement of NDFD clauses in
the state. 202 Thus, the legislature assumed that the existing common-law
exceptions would continue to shield private contractors from harsh
forfeitures suffered in association with NDFD clauses.
However, the recent result of Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham 203 reveals
the dangers of continued silence. 204 In Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, a
federal court applying California law found that NDFD clauses were not
per se unenforceable in all private contracts. 205 In reaching its
202

ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE
CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CDRTC s 16.02; see Stephen G. Walker,
Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6 CONSTRUCTION LAW 9, 10 (1985-1986)
(stating that, at the time section 7102 was passed, “California construction lawyers have long felt
that a ‘no damage for delay’ clause would not be enforced where unreasonable delays have been
caused by the project owner.”); 1987 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 98 (describing the Legislature’s intent in
enacting section 7102 as follows: “Existing law provides that contract provisions in construction
contracts of public agencies, and subcontracts thereunder, which limit the contractee’s liability to an
extension of time for delay for which the contractee is responsible and which delay is unreasonable
under the circumstances involved, and not within the contemplation of the parties, shall not be
construed to preclude the recovery of damages by the contractor or subcontractor. This bill would
provide that no public agency may require the waiver, alteration, or limitation of the applicability of
this law and would provide that any such waiver, alteration, or limitation is void.” (emphasis
added)).
203
Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667 (2008)
(discussed in the Introduction of this Comment).
204
See Schneier, 30 NO.1 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION REPORTER at 15 (noting that California
law has been silent on the issue of whether NDFD clauses are enforceable in public contracts, and
stating that the Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham court determined that “the only California case setting
common law limits on the enforceability of “no damages” clauses—was superseded by the
enactment of Public Contract Code § 7102”); see also Robert T. Sturgeon, Federal Court Holds “No
Damage for Delay Clauses” Are Per Se Enforceable on Federal Public Works Projects in
California, CONSTRUCTION & INFRASTRUCTURE LAW BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010),
www.constructionandinfrastructurelawblog.com/2010/03/articles/public-works/federal-court-holdsno-damage-for-delay-clauses-are-per-se-enforceable-on-federal-public-works-projects-in-california/
(“The Harper/Nielson-Dillingham court . . . held that ‘no damage for delay’ clauses in contracts
between private parties on federal projects are per se enforceable under California law.”);
Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. at 667 (holding that “outside of Cal. Pub. Cont. Code §
7102, which applies to ‘construction contracts of public agencies and subcontracts thereunder,’
neither the California legislature nor the California Supreme Court has set forth any exceptions to
enforceability of express ‘no damage for delay’ clauses in agreements between private parties.”).
But see Robert T. Sturgeon, Federal Court Holds “No Damage for Delay Clauses” Are Per Se
Enforceable on Federal Public Works Projects in California, CONSTRUCTION & INFRASTRUCTURE
LAW BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), www.constructionandinfrastructurelawblog.com/2010/03/articles/
public-works/federal-court-holds-no-damage-for-delay-clauses-are-per-se-enforceable-on-federalpublic-works-projects-in-california/ (arguing that “it is not clear that the Claims Court correctly
interpreted California law, or whether a California court deciding the issue would reach the same
conclusion”).
205
Robert T. Sturgeon, Federal Court Holds “No Damage for Delay Clauses” Are Per Se
Enforceable on Federal Public Works Projects in California, CONSTRUCTION & INFRASTRUCTURE
LAW BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), www.constructionandinfrastructurelawblog.com/2010/03/articles/
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conclusion, the court reasoned that previous case law that expressly
applied common-law exceptions to the enforceability of NDFD clauses
in private contracts had been superseded by the enactment of section
7102. 206 Because the common-law exceptions no longer applied, the
court found that an “express and unambiguous” NDFD clause constituted
an “iron-bound bar” against potential liability as between private
contractors and subcontractors in California. 207 It is unknown whether a
California court interpreting the same laws would reach this conclusion,
creating even greater uncertainty for owners and contractors attempting
to predict the import of NDFD clauses in private contracts. 208
A second limitation of section 7102 is its exclusive applicability to
NDFD clauses that are both “unreasonable under the circumstances
provided” and “not within the contemplation of the parties,” 209 rather
than applying to all NDFD clauses in the event of owner-caused delay.
As previously discussed, NDFD clauses are inherently unreasonable
because they impose upon contractors virtually incalculable liability
Furthermore, because
associated with owner-caused delay. 210
contractors are unable to control the performances of owners and their
agents, public policy should dictate that owner-caused delays are outside
of the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. 211 At
present, these additional restrictions create an undesirable result: even in
public-works/federal-court-holds-no-damage-for-delay-clauses-are-per-se-enforceable-on-federalpublic-works-projects-in-california/.
206
Schneier, 30 NO.1 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION REPORTER at 15 (stating that “[t]he Harper
court found that Hawley—the only California case setting common law limits on the enforceability
of ‘no damages’ clauses—was superseded by the enactment of Public Contract Code § 7102”).
207
Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. at 678-79.
208
Robert T. Sturgeon, Federal Court Holds “‘No Damage for Delay Clauses’” Are Per Se
Enforceable on Federal Public Works Projects in California, CONSTRUCTION & INFRASTRUCTURE
LAW BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), www.constructionandinfrastructurelawblog.com/2010/03/articles/
public-works/federal-court-holds-no-damage-for-delay-clauses-are-per-se-enforceable-on-federalpublic-works-projects-in-california/ (“It is not clear that the Claims Court correctly interpreted
California law, or whether a California court deciding the issue would reach the same conclusion.”).
209
CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (Westlaw 2011).
210
See Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857,
1877 (2005).
211
See Hawley v. Orange Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 27 Cal. Rptr. 478, 483 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (citing the prevailing public policy that “[a] contract will not be so construed as to put one
party at the mercy of the other”); Harris v. Klure, 23 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(recognizing that in interpreting a contractual provision, courts as a matter of public policy should
“avoid an interpretation which will make the contract unusual, extraordinary, harsh, unjust or
inequitable”); see also Grandoff & Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A Public Policy
Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 12 (Oct. 2001) (“A no damage for delay clause which on its face imposes a
penalty on a contractor by denying a legal remedy, while excusing owner default, is contrary to
public policy.”).
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public contracts when the owner causes delay, an unfair and inequitable
NDFD clause will nevertheless be upheld unless a court exercises its
discretion in determining that the disputed delay was both unreasonable
and unforeseen by the parties. 212 This is true even though section 7102
was enacted to bring California statutory law in line with common-law
treatment of NDFD clauses, 213 and California courts have rarely enforced
NDFD clauses to preclude the recovery of costs incurred as a result of
owner-caused delays. 214 The current language of section 7102 allows
continued judicial discretion over the determination of whether a
particular delay is unreasonable or not within the contemplation of the
parties. Such judicial discretion is undesirable because it will inevitably
lead to inconsistent results, lingering uncertainty and protracted litigation
between the parties. 215
V.

CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

The current limitations of California Public Contract Code section
7102 should be resolved by amending the statute to include language
similar to that of Ohio Revised Code Annotated section 4113.62(C):

212

See Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald Constr. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590, 59697 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding delay caused by a prime contractor’s concealment of project conditions
to be unreasonable, thus voiding the application of a “no damage for delay” clause under CAL. PUB.
CONT. CODE § 7102); see Hawley, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (stating that it is a question of fact as to
whether parties intend no damage for delay provision to preclude recovery of costs incurred by
owner directed changes and owner caused delays); see Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses In
Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. 471, 483-84 (1978) (explaining that the
determination of whether a particular form of delay was beyond the contemplation of the parties at
the time of contracting is a question of foreseeability).
213
Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 9, 10 (1985-1986); see ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION
DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2001), available at Westlaw CDRTC s
16.02.
214
Howard Contracting, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595–96 (explaining that “California courts
generally held that ‘no damage for delay’ clauses in public contracts did not apply to delays arising
from a breach of contract caused by the other party to the contract”); see McGuire & Hester v. City
& Cnty. of S.F., 247 P.2d 934 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (a no damage for delay clause did not bar
contractor’s recovery of delay damages caused by the failure of the city, for whom the work was
being done, to perform its agreement to obtain rights of way prior to commencement of work); see
Maurice L. Bein, Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 321 P.2d 753 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (an owner
who concealed conditions it knew would later cause delay was estopped from asserting a no damage
for delay clause to avoid liability).
215
See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1869
(“The question of whether any given no damages for delay clause is judicially enforceable is
ultimately a very difficult one.”).
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(1) Any provision of a construction contract, agreement, or
understanding, or specification or other documentation that is made a
part of a construction contract, agreement, or understanding, that
waives or precludes liability for delay during the course of a
construction contract when the cause of the delay is a proximate result
of the owner’s act or failure to act, or that waives any other remedy for
a construction contract when the cause of the delay is a proximate
result of the owner’s act or failure to act, is void and unenforceable as
against public policy.
(2) Any provision of a construction subcontract, agreement, or
understanding, or specification or other documentation that is made
part of a construction subcontract, agreement, or understanding, that
waives or precludes liability for delay during the course of a
construction subcontract when the cause of the delay is a proximate
result of the owner’s or contractor’s act or failure to act, or that waives
any other remedy for a construction subcontract when the cause of the
delay is a proximate result of the owner’s or contractor’s act or failure
216
to act, is void and unenforceable as against public policy.

The Ohio statute is broader than California Public Contract Code section
7102, in that it applies to all construction contracts, both public and
private. 217
Additionally, the Ohio statute mirrors legislation in
Washington 218 and North Carolina 219 by rendering NDFD clauses void
under all circumstances when the delay is caused by an owner. 220
By adopting language to this effect, California would render all
NDFD clauses void in instances of owner-caused delay. This would
eliminate the need for judicial determination of whether owner-caused
delays are unreasonable or were within the contemplation of the parties
at the time of contracting, thus alleviating some of the uncertainty
contractors face in determining whether an NDFD clause will be
enforced under section 7102. Furthermore, this language would also
address issues of fundamental fairness, by preventing one party to a
construction contract from being placed at the mercy of another’s
negligence, 221 and by furnishing all parties with legal remedies for

216
217

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4113.62(C)(1), (2) (Westlaw 2011).
Susan Sisskind Dunne, “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 38, 40

(1998).
218

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.360 (Westlaw 2011).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-134.3 (Westlaw 2011).
220
Dunne, “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW. at 40.
221
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 284 (2011).
219
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injuries received. 222 Such statutory recognition that owner-caused delays
should not preclude a contractor’s ability to recover delay damages
would be more consistent with California’s common-law precedent. 223
Additionally, by revising section 7102 as suggested, California
would expand its statutory protections to cover instances of ownercaused delay in all construction contracts, which could prevent
contractors in federal works and private contracts from suffering harsh
results similar to those in Harper/Nielsen Dillingham.
CONCLUSION
The modern construction process is inherently complex, and delays
caused by any one party may result in significant financial damages to
others. 224 Therefore, it is not surprising that parties seek contractual
methods of protecting themselves from liability associated with
construction delays. 225 However, the NDFD clause has proven itself to
be a draconian instrument 226 that operates in contrast to public policy
interests 227 and functions as an ineffective tool for apportioning the risks
of construction delays. 228 A range of alternate methods exist through
222
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for the Next Millennium, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK § 2.01[A] (1999) (illustrating that a
construction project of average complexity may involve between five and fifteen firms working on
the design process, as well as forty to a hundred companies that are engaged in construction and
many more companies hired to supply materials and services necessary to complete the project); see
S. GREGORY JOY, EUGENE J. HEADY & JAMES E. STEPHENSON, ALTERNATIVE CLAUSES TO
STANDARD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 7 (2010), available at Westlaw ACSCC s 1.02 (explaining
that ordinary construction projects require the participation and risk the financial resources of a large
number of parties). “If one falls down, many others may follow. The chain of risk extends far
beyond those who have direct contracts with a failing party.” Id.
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Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857,
1858 (2005).
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See Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53
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(2002).
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which parties are able to allocate the risk of loss in a meaningful manner
that will not result in total forfeiture. 229 Thus, the absence of NDFD
clauses will not burden parties in the construction industry.
Through enacting California Public Contract Code section 7102,
California has taken an important step toward protecting contractors
from an NDFD clause’s harsh effects, but this is not enough. Additional
legislative action is necessary to address strong public policy concerns
surrounding NDFD clauses, as well as to clarify how NDFD clauses
should be treated by California courts. The California legislature should
respond to these concerns by revising section 7102 to extend the existing
statutory protections to all public and private contracts when the owner
causes delay, thereby joining the federal government and the growing
number of states and professional associations that have decided not to
impose or enforce NDFD clauses under such conditions.
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See id. at 1879-84; see also Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to
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32 (2002).
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